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Abstract
This survey covers some of the main philosophical debates raised
by the framework of effective field theories during the last decades. It
is centered on three issues: whether effective field theories underpin
a specific realist picture of the world, whether they support an anti-
reductionist picture of physics, and whether they provide reasons to
give up the ultimate aspiration of formulating a final and complete
physical theory. Reviewing the past and current literature, we argue
that effective field theories do not give convincing reasons to adopt
a particular stance towards these speculative issues. They hold good
prospects for asking ontologically perspicuous and sensible questions
about currently accessible domains. With respect to more fundamental
questions, however, the only certainty is provisional and instrumental:
effective theories are currently indispensable for conducting fruitful
scientific research.
1 What is an effective field theory?
The term effective has a variety of meanings in exact sciences. A
computational method is effective if it requires only a reasonable amount
of time and resources. An effective prediction is one that has high
success rate and decisive value for evaluating some hypothesis. We
review various philosophical issues related to one particular meaning
of the term, namely a set of characteristics which distinguish a specific
type of theories, called Effective Field Theories (EFTs), from other
traditional products of scientific theorizing, such as phenomenological
models or putatively fundamental theories [27]. Although this mean-
ing of the term effective might appear restricted, the framework of
EFTs is actually quite extensive. It is closely associated with a variety
of instruments and results, including the modern Wilsonian Renor-
malization Group (RG) theory and lattice methods in Quantum Field
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Theory (QFT). This framework is also successfully implemented in var-
ious disciplines ranging from nuclear physics to inflationary cosmology
and applied to different types of classical and quantum theories as
well as point-particle and low-energy string theories. This large suc-
cess suggests that EFTs might significantly impact current and future
philosophical discussions about physics. Before engaging with the de-
bates that have animated the literature in the last decades, we first set
the stage with a few conceptual and methodological remarks.
While EFTs became increasingly widespread in the last forty years,
they bear some conceptual affinity with earlier research programs [43,
44]. In the 1950s, the physics community was not sure whether the
methods of QFT based on the use of gauge symmetry would lead one
to a correct understanding of the strong interaction. Similar doubts
had been expressed and successfully lifted a decade earlier with regard
to quantum electrodynamics. However, the strong interaction did not
seem to yield to the same methods and give way to a similar solution.
In 1954, at a conference attended by Oppenheimer, Gell-Mann, Fermi,
Wick, and Dyson, the physicist Goldberger challenged the applicability
of QFT to nuclear interactions. Surprisingly, nobody objected to the
contrary [34]. The reason had to do with the irreducible divergencies
that arise in the application of perturbative methods to theories with
strong couplings. Around this period, physicists began to look for a
non-perturbative framework to treat the strong interaction and they
needed a new methodology. One of the best known answers was to be
found in the S-matrix approach, which had already been impulsed in
the 1940s through the work of Heisenberg. The S-matrix only aimed
at asking questions about physical observables: it avoided the need
to have knowledge about the fundamental structure of interactions
between elementary particles [26].
In the case of EFTs, the unknown element can be new physics be-
yond the Standard Model or the exact structure of interactions between
quarks and gluons at low energies. In analogy with the S-matrix ap-
proach, EFTs aim at asking questions about the physics relevant within
a specific domain, without the need to worry about the physical content
of the fundamental theory. Just as the S-matrix enables an exclusive
focus on observable quantities by disregarding the quantum field, EFTs
free the theorist from the need to worry about the particular details
of high-energy physics. To this end, the EFT methodology prescribes
that the Lagrangians include all the possible terms compatible with
a given set of symmetry constraints. If the high-energy theory is un-
known, the hope is that all high-energy effects on low-energy physics
can be accounted for by such terms. If, on the contrary, the high-energy
theory is known, then high-energy physics typically generates the most
general low-energy Lagrangian compatible with the symmetries of the
theory.
Consider first an abstract example of EFT. The theory is typically
defined by a Lagrangian valid up to some scale Λ, which divides into
a finite sum of local operators of dimension four or less and an infinite
sum of higher dimensional local operators with dimensionless coupling
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parameters λn:
L = L(d≤4) +
∞∑
n=1
λn
Λn
On. (1)
In general, the value of the parameters of L is either fixed experimen-
tally (at least for a finite number of them) or determined from the
underlying high-energy theory through RG calculations, and the form
of the operators On is fixed by the symmetries of the theory. The
parameters of L(d≤4) and the higher order terms encode information
about the unknown physics at scales higher than Λ, which means that
this Lagrangian can be used to study low-energy effects of unknown
high-energy physics without having to specify what this physics actu-
ally is.
As a concrete realistic example, consider the electroweak EFT with-
out the Higgs field, which reproduces the Standard Model for the
light degrees of freedom (light quarks, leptons and electroweak gauge
bosons) at sufficiently small energies compared to the Higgs mass [35].
The lowest-order effective Lagrangian L(d<4)EW includes the standard ki-
netic terms for the electroweak gauge bosons, the leptons, the quarks,
and the Goldstone bosons. At the fourth order, the most general ef-
fective Lagrangian with only gauge bosons and Goldstone bosons,
L(4)EW =
14∑
i=0
aiOi, (2)
contains fifteen operators. Again, this complexity stems from the re-
quirement that we use the most general form of the Lagrangian com-
patible with symmetry principles.
Gell-Mann once formulated a rule called “the totalitarian princi-
ple”, which asserts that everything that is not forbidden is compulsory
[20]. The EFT Lagrangians (1) and (2) perfectly illustrate this rule. If
one wishes to offer the most complete description of some low-energy
phenomena by using only a few symmetry principles, then the most co-
herent, economical, and procedurally concise prescription would be to
include all possible terms consistent with such principles. The result-
ing Lagrangian has a complex structure but the inclusion of multiple
interaction terms is precisely what makes EFTs so attractive (to turn
Gell-Mann’s political metaphor upside down, it is democratic inclusiv-
ity that leads to felicitous complexity). Through this procedure, the
theorist is able to parametrize any high-energy effect in accordance
with its relevance at low energies and systematically organize poten-
tial information about unknown physics. The structure of the EFT
Lagrangian also enables the theorist to compute correction terms by
increasing order in the inverse power of the scale Λ, thereby extracting
highly precise predictions.
Taking the complexity of a theory to be one of its chief virtues
is a far cry from traditional remarks made both by philosophers and
physicists. Quine named several criteria of theory selection without re-
alizing that they may come in conflict with one another: “Simplicity,
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economy and naturalness contribute to the molding of scientific theo-
ries generally” [37]. Dirac also praised simplicity, although he ranked
it after mathematical beauty:
The research worker, in his efforts to express the laws of Na-
ture in mathematical form, should strive mainly for mathe-
matical beauty. He should still take simplicity into consid-
eration in a subordinate way to beauty. . . . It often happens
that the requirements of simplicity and beauty are the same,
but when they clash the latter must take precedence. [14]
Perhaps most clearly of all, Wigner came to raise some doubts about
the relevance of the criterion of simplicity in science. While physical
theories are collections of laws of nature, mathematical concepts that
express them are of our choosing. We “manipulate [them for] making
striking, brilliant arguments” but do not select them for their simplicity
[46]. Yet, Wigner was still far from praising the lack of simplicity as a
correlate of the efficiency and predictive power of a theory.
To continue with our example, the structure of the EFT Lagrangian
(2) is still carefully tailored despite its complexity. CP and SU(2)L ×
U(1)Y invariance impose strict symmetry constraints on the set of
possible operators. Also, three of the fifteen operators can be elimi-
nated by using the equations of motion under the assumption that the
fermions are (approximately) massless. With the remaining terms, one
finds various effects such as the usual electroweak oblique corrections,
corrections to rare B and K decays, or the CP -violating parameter.
And just like the S-matrix, the electroweak EFT allows one to ignore
the dynamics of fields relevant at high energies, including the Higgs
field, and therefore to offer a simplified description of the low-energy
electroweak sector of the Standard Model.
This last point calls for a more general methodological remark.
The electroweak EFT is actually developed by following a ‘top-down’
strategy: the high-energy physical theory is known but unsuitable to
study the low-energy regime. This may occur for a variety of rea-
sons: the computation is too complex, the perturbative method is in-
applicable, or the high-energy theory does not provide enough physical
details in the low-energy regime. Top-down EFTs were employed as
early as the 1930s, e.g., in the Euler-Heisenberg calculation of photon-
photon scattering at small energies within the framework of Dirac’s
QFT [15, 16, 28]. A more recent example is chiral perturbation theory,
which gives a low-energy approximation of quantum chromodynamics
in the light quark sector. Yet another example is the use of EFTs in
condensed matter physics: even when the underlying theory is known,
often the only tractable way to compute low-energy observables is to
build an effective model as if the underlying theory were unknown.
Current high-energy physics also uses an alternative ‘bottom-up’
strategy: the underlying high-energy theory is unknown and the low-
energy EFT is constructed by formulating the most general Lagrangian
compatible with a given set of degrees of freedom and symmetries.
Theoretic constructs that employ fundamental principles tasked with
limiting the possibilities in a description of unknown facts have been
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called “blackbox models” [26]. Although blackbox models appear in
many fields of physics, from Einstein’s “principle theories” to device-
independent methods in quantum information [25], in the case of EFTs
they take on a universal and fundamental character: it is common
among physicists to think of all current physical theories, including the
Standard Model, as low-energy EFTs of some unknown fundamental
theory.
Philosophers, too, are attracted by the idea that our current best
theories might be best understood and formulated as EFTs. Some of
them even claim that EFTs bring new insights into the way we un-
derstand the structure of the world, the relation between theories, and
the ultimate aspirations of physics. Yet, how revolutionary and dis-
tinctively new these insights are remains a controversial matter. We
provide a critical survey of some of the main philosophical debates over
the implications of EFTs for our understanding of ontology (Sections
2 and 3), reduction (Section 4), and fundamentality (Section 5). In
large part, these three philosophical interrogations go back to an early
study of EFTs by Cao and Schweber [11]. While we do not neces-
sarily agree with the views expressed by these authors, we recognize
that their work has shaped many of the subsequent debates in the
philosophical literature. Following Cao and Schweber, we structure
the review around three questions:
1. Do EFTs underpin a specific ontological picture of the world or
are they merely instruments to gain information about poorly
understood domains?
2. Do EFTs support an anti-reductionist view of physics?
3. Do EFTs provide reasons to give up the ultimate aspiration of
formulating a final and complete physical theory?
2 A Different Picture of the World?
Cao and Schweber claim that in the context of QFT, the framework
of EFTs underwrites a pluralistic picture of the world arranged into
an infinite hierarchy of quasi-autonomous domains delimited by well-
separated and physically meaningful mass scales. Each EFT (or set
of EFTs) specifies a domain with its own set of entities, structures,
and laws. Cao and Schweber rely on three main results and sets
of techniques in QFT to support this claim: (i) the mechanism of
spontaneous symmetry breaking (SSB); (ii) Wilsonian RG methods;
(iii) the decoupling theorem. The latter is particularly important
and will be the focus of this section. The relevance of SSB and RG
methods for the question of autonomy has been discussed elsewhere
[2, 3, 5, 6, 17, 23, 32, 38, 47, 49].
Broadly speaking, the decoupling theorem is a general result to
the effect that the high-energy contributions to observables derived
from specific types of QFTs have a negligible effect on the low-energy
contributions to observables obtained by restricting these theories to
low-energy regimes [1]. More precisely, one starts with the perturbative
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Lagrangian formulation of a renormalizable QFT containing a heavy
and a light field characterized by scales M and m, respectively, with
mM (the light field does not need to be massive). If one eliminates
the heavy field from the theory and defines a low-energy effective theory
containing only the light field, the only manifestation of the heavy
field is encoded in a finite number of perturbatively renormalizable
parameters and wave-function renormalization factors, as well as in an
infinite set of irrelevant operators suppressed by negative powers of the
mass of the heavy field (“quasi-autonomy”).
Cao and Schweber draw from the decoupling theorem the following
lesson:
. . . with the decoupling theorem and the concept of EFT
emerges a hierarchical picture of nature offered by QFT,
one that explains why the description at any one level is so
stable and is not disturbed by whatever happens at higher
energies, and thus justifies the use of such descriptions. [11]
In other words, if the world contains a hierarchy of fields with suffi-
ciently separated characteristic scales, the decoupling theorem offers a
general justification for believing that the ‘parts’ of the system across
scales are relatively insensitive from one another, isolating fields from
each other, and offering a separate and distinct description of the sys-
tem at each level.
The main response to this claim in the literature has been negative,
because the decoupling theorem only applies to QFTs under highly
restrictive conditions. As Hartmann points out early on [27], the high-
energy theory needs to be perturbatively renormalizable, which sits in
tension with the scenario of a never-ending tower of non-renormalizable
EFTs. Yet, Hartmann remains somewhat elusive about the exact na-
ture of this restriction. Perhaps Cao and Schweber assume that QFTs
in particle physics are ‘approximately’ perturbatively renormalizable.
Typically, for sufficiently low energies, non-renormalizable QFTs take
the form of perturbatively renormalizable theories in the infinite cut-off
limit. In Hartmann’s defense, we note that there are clear exceptions:
namely, theories for which all of the renormalizable interactions vanish
because of symmetry constraints (e.g., the EFT Lagrangian describing
the scattering of photons off atoms at low energies, chiral perturbation
theory). These QFTs, insofar as one takes them to be interacting theo-
ries, are not approximately renormalizable and the decoupling theorem
does not apply to them.
Bain provides a further defense of Cao and Schweber’s argument
[2]. He insists, following Georgi [21], on making a distinction between
Wilsonian and continuum EFTs. Broadly speaking, this distinction is
based on whether the split between the low-energy and high-energy
physics depends on the mass parameter of the theory. Typically, a
Wilsonian EFT is defined by integrating out heavy fields in the path
integral formulation of a more comprehensive Lagrangian QFT. A con-
tinuum EFT is defined by selecting a relevant set of low-energy de-
grees of freedom, including all possible local operators compatible with
the original structure of the Lagrangian and renormalizing the theory
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through dimensional regularization. The particular scaling behavior of
the parameters of these operators is fixed by identifying, under some
reasonable matching conditions, the correlation functions of the low-
energy theory with those of a higher energy theory. This identification
occurs at a specific energy scale.
Bain’s argument is then as follows. In the case of Wilsonian EFTs,
one needs to assume that the high-energy theory is renormalizable in
order to rely on the decoupling theorem and therefore faces the issues
raised by Hartmann. In the case of continuum EFTs, by contrast,
one does not need to make such an assumption. Strictly speaking, the
decoupling theorem does not apply in this case. Yet, Bain claims that
it is “inserted by hand in the form of matching conditions” [2]. How
exactly the matching conditions might play the role of the decoupling
theorem is not very clear. Surely, Bain means that if one constructs
a continuum EFT in the sense specified above, then it displays the
same kind of limited sensitivity to high-energy physics as stated in the
decoupling theorem. And this feature warrants, in Bain’s view, the
claim that continuum EFTs are “capable of supporting an ontology of
quasi-autonomous domains”.
Bain’s solution seems intuitive but it begs a number of questions.
The decoupling theorem is not added “by hand” in the matching pro-
cedure; one merely observes the same kind of insensitivity as stated in
the decoupling theorem and this is far from providing the sort of the-
oretical justification that Cao and Schweber seek in the first place. It
is not enough to observe the existence of a good degree of insensitivity
between successive domains on a case-by-case basis; to support their
hierarchical picture, Cao and Schweber wish to underwrite these par-
ticular features of EFTs with a mathematically rigorous and general
result. While the decoupling theorem seems unable to fulfill this task,
Bain’s attempt to trade the explanatory value and scope of a general
result for a merely heuristic foundation also appears to be insufficient.
Our response, contra Bain, is to keep looking for a mathematical
result but also to side with Hartmann in his critique of the use of the de-
coupling theorem. Since this theorem is unable to provide a sufficiently
general ground for Cao and Schweber’s picture, the only remaining op-
tion for justifying relative autonomy of scales seems to be an appeal to
the formal features of the Wilsonian RG: e.g., the difference of scaling
behavior between relevant and irrelevant local operators. In particu-
lar, contributions from irrelevant operators “dwindle” at low energies,
to use Butterfield and Bouatta’s felicitous expression [10]. Continuum
EFTs then ‘satisfy’ the decoupling theorem for two main reasons: (i)
in four dimensions, continuum EFTs contain a finite number of rel-
evant operators and an infinite number of irrelevant operators; (ii)
continuum EFTs contain an infinite number of free parameters. Point
(i) means that the sensitivity to high-energy physics at low energies
depends mainly on a finite number of independent parameters; point
(ii), that it is always possible to match exactly the predictions of the
low-energy theory with those of the high-energy theory and make sure
that no sensitivity to high energies is left out. This suggests that in all
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situations the success of Cao and Schweber’s argument about quasi-
autonomous domains may not rest on the validity of the decoupling
theorem but on the success of Wilsonian RG methods. When the lat-
ter is considered, however, one faces a whole new set of issues beyond
the scope of this review; most importantly, the problem of naturalness
[4, 24, 40, 47, 49].
3 Instrumentalism and realism
The reliance on what is done ‘by hand’, which has taken in the previous
section the allure of a conceptual argument, suggests a more pragmatic
and instrumentalist attitude towards EFTs: EFTs are efficient tools
to derive precise predictions and organize physical effects according to
natural hierarchies of scales. Maybe there is nothing more to EFTs
than this instrumental and epistemic aspect, i.e., EFTs do not under-
write a particular picture of the world. This view has been discussed
in the literature for at least as long as Cao and Schweber’s competing
argument.
For instance, Huggett and Weingard take a cautious stance mo-
tivated by the uncertainty about the existence of a final theory [29].
Since no course of future events is excluded by the EFT framework,
they suggest that the most reasonable attitude is to take EFTs as sci-
entific tools which are helpful for making progress in physics. One
should not draw conclusions about the hierarchical structure of the
world, the existence of a fundamental level, or the prospects of a com-
pletely unified theoretical description; the only philosophically sensible
conclusion is that EFTs help to explore new domains and extend the
scope of physics.
Hartmann, too, notes that EFTs do not force us to stop thinking
about final theories [27]. Even if the project of constructing a final
theory proves to be illusory at the end of the day, it still works as a
fruitful regulative ideal. Like Huggett and Weingard, he finds a prag-
matic position advocated by Georgi [21] to be the most attractive both
epistemically and methodologically: the main reason to use EFTs is
because they provide efficient tools to expand our knowledge. Hart-
mann goes further to suggest that EFTs fulfill a distinctive function
alongside phenomenological models and putatively fundamental the-
ories. This function should be appreciated rather than dismissed: it
would be damaging to the progress of physics to eliminate scientific
theorizing via EFTs on the grounds that they do not reveal reality or
the true nature of the physical world.
Butterfield continues in a similar vein: the EFT approach is based
on “an opportunistic or instrumentalist attitude to being unconfident”
about the applicability of QFT at high energies [9]. This attitude has
also been proposed by one of the authors in a previous work [23]. New
empirical facts may become available, restore confidence and lead to
a new and better physical theory. Furthermore, if the next physical
theory happens not to use QFT methods, then the privileged status of
the current best EFTs would be downgraded to that of mere instru-
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ments restricted to exploring a specific ‘local’ region. When or if this
happens, then EFTs, with respect to their relevance for engaging with
fundamental questions, would at best stay as monuments to physicists’
perseverance.
This, of course, does not mean that EFTs do not possess important
epistemic, pragmatic and computational virtues qua scientific instru-
ments. In particular, they offer: (i) a local and intuitive understanding
of low-energy phenomena, via simplified descriptions obtained by se-
lecting only relevant degrees of freedom; (ii) efficient tools to solve
computational problems, e.g., obtaining higher order correction terms;
(iii) a direct solution to mathematical issues, e.g., the problem of ul-
traviolet divergences and consistency in QFT; (iv) efficient techniques
to discover new physics and make new predictions.
In its most extreme form, the instrumentalist approach to EFTs
takes them to be merely efficient tools which do not provide any onto-
logical guidance about the world. This approach is often adopted as an
instantiation of one’s overall anti-realist stance. But even a scientific
realist may find it tempting due to a certain psychological discomfort:
EFTs are not meant by construction to disclose fundamental truths.
As Shankar vividly puts it: “Often the opponents of EFT or even
its practitioners feel they are somehow compromising” [42]. This con-
trasts with a more optimistic outlook about the ontological significance
of EFTs: purportedly, EFTs are not simply efficient tools but also oc-
cupy a privileged position if one is to give the most accurate picture of
the world by means of models currently thought to be successful. The
difference between these viewpoints might at first seem vanishingly
small but it actually reflects a significant philosophical disagreement
in the debate over scientific realism.
Simply put, scientific realism is the stance that takes our best sci-
entific theories to offer approximately true descriptions of the world.
The history of science shows, however, that many past theories have
proven to make radically false claims about unobservable entities and
structures when these theories are assessed relative to their succes-
sors. This suggests that our current best theories might be in the
same situation. The most popular response to this problem is a po-
sition called ‘selective realism’: even though our best theories do not
get everything right, they still contain parts that are likely to remain
(approximately) true [30, 36, 50]. Williams [48] and J. Fraser [19] have
recently defended this position in the context of QFT: they argue that
Wilsonian RG methods provide ‘local’ (i.e., restricted to QFT) tools
to distinguish essential parts in current EFTs that are likely to with-
stand future theory change and give (approximately) true descriptions
of the world. In particular, RG methods give selective realists some
confidence in the claim that the low-energy content of the presently
most successful EFTs is largely independent of the high-energy con-
tent of future theories and is therefore likely to remain unaffected by
the discovery of new high-energy physics.
As this example shows, one needs to specify, methodologically speak-
ing, the mechanism of selection implied in the concept of selective re-
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alism. Selection operates in a clear and consensual way if the complete
theory is at hand: parts of EFTs that are likely to remain (approx-
imately) true are then clearly identifiable as limit cases or specific
approximations of the high-energy theory. In the case of bottom-up
EFTs, however, no knowledge of a complete theory is available, and
this might generate important disagreements on the selection of the-
oretical parts that are likely to survive. Various tricks may help to
identify such parts, e.g., a relational analysis of EFTs with respect to
each other. In order to remove the possibility of disagreement due to
an excessively subjective assessment of what is real, the proponents of
selective realism often rely on mathematical criteria and attribute the-
oretical longevity to the most invariant parts of the theory, for exam-
ple, to the universality of low-energy dynamics specified by an infrared
fixed point. If individual terms in the Lagrangians do not survive after
theory change, universal dynamical properties have a better chance to
find a place in the new theory.
The ambition of selective realism is to enable realists to make re-
liable ontological commitments about the world. Hence, besides se-
lecting relevant theoretical parts, the selective realist also needs to
say what these parts represent in the world. Williams makes a first
step in this direction by criticizing the standard realist interpretative
strategy: it “has led philosophers astray” in the context of QFT [48].
In particular, some philosophers highly concerned with the infamous
mathematical issues plaguing realistic QFTs have been drawn to be-
lieve that mathematically rigorous yet highly unrealistic QFT models
in lower dimensions give us more reliable ontological information about
the world than the heuristic yet empirically adequate QFT models in
high-energy physics. For instance, D. Fraser draws on the algebraic
program in QFT to argue that QFT does not support an ontology of
particles [18]. The framework of EFTs, Williams suggests in response,
provides a more reliable and informed way to engage with the interpre-
tation of physical theories: (i) interpret the content of theories insofar
as they are successfully applied in physicists’ practice; (ii) restrict the
scope of interpretation to limited domains where theories are likely to
remain approximately true; (iii) interpret theories in relation with one
another and not as if they were putatively fundamental theories.
Williams’s and J. Fraser’s points are well taken. Clearly, the frame-
work of EFTs provides a refinement of the notion of approximate truth
by giving a mathematical specification of the limit at which a theory
is likely to break down. The relational analysis of theories helps to
identify their parts that are likely to survive theory change, e.g., via
the application of RG methods. Universality arguments show that the
current descriptions of low-energy physics are robust under variations
of the high-energy content of a large class of potentially new theories.
This last point recently provoked an objection from Ruetsche [41].
A problem she identifies is that we do not know whether the future
theory will fall within the bounds of RG analysis. If it does not, then
the universality and robustness arguments will not work anymore. If
it does by default, i.e., if the RG-space is not specified or supposed to
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be the space of all possible theories, then we lose the confidence gained
by the concrete implementation of RG methods. Ruetsche makes an-
other relevant point: RG enthusiasts are often quite vague about the
features they take EFTs to latch onto. And without an account of the
specific ontological guidance EFTs provide in currently accessible do-
mains, Williams’s and J. Fraser’s defense of selective realism remains
too open-ended. One might focus on invariant higher-order structural
features exhibited by the mathematical structure of Lagrangian EFTs
and of the RG space. Yet, Ruetsche’s point would still apply. If the
formalism of the new theory after a future theory change happens to
be incommensurable with the mathematical structure of QFT, even
the parts favored by selective realists will become void of ontological
status. While this prospect must always be kept in mind, we believe
that, as of today, selective realism still provides a welcome alterna-
tive to the instrumentalist approach to EFTs. Yet, the selective realist
needs to say explicitly what the world is made of in currently accessible
domains.
4 Reduction and Emergence
While many physicists believe that the men and women of their profes-
sion ought to seek for fundamental truths about nature, those following
the EFT approach spend their time and effort on a model unfit by its
very design to reveal any such truth. The status of the fundamental,
let alone ultimate, physical theory in the light of EFTs will be our
subject for the remainder of this article.
If one assumes that a fundamental theory exists, it is an open ques-
tion whether one can derive EFTs from this fundamental theory under
some plausible assumptions. It is also an open question whether EFTs
can be derived from each other. While these two interrogations re-
main distinct, many physicists agree that such derivations are possible
in both situations. By agreeing, they adopt a reductionist perspective
on EFTs. Giudice, for example, writes: “Effective field theories are a
powerful realization of the reductionist approach” [22]..
The topic of reduction is highly controversial and it is far beyond
the scope of this review to do justice to the rich discussions that have
animated the philosophical literature in the last decades. In the context
of physics, it is relatively standard to distinguish between conceptual,
explanatory, and ontological reduction. Conceptual and explanatory
reducibility is taken as a guide to ontological reducibility. The idea,
in a nutshell, is the following. Suppose that all the concepts used to
specify the entities at some level L can be translated in terms of, or
replaced by, the concepts used to specify the entities at some more
fundamental level L′. Suppose in addition that the law-like behavior
of the entities at level L can be fully explained in terms of the law-like
behavior of the entities at level L′. Then, there are good reasons to
believe that the entities at level L are reducible to the entities at level
L′. Here, reduction can be understood either in an eliminative or in a
conservative sense:
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1. If the descriptions at levels L and L′ are radically incompatible
with one another, there are good reasons to eliminate the entities
at level L altogether;
2. If the descriptions at level L approximate those at level L′, there
are good reasons to identify the entities at level L with some
composite of the entities at level L′, say, a complex pattern con-
stituted by the behavior of those entities.
Emergence is traditionally understood in terms of irreducibility: the
behavior and the properties of some entities at level L are emergent if
they cannot be reduced to the behavior and properties of entities at
some level L′.
Nagel famously proposed a relatively simple scheme for analyzing
conceptual and explanatory reduction [33]. The basic idea is to focus
on logico-linguistic relations between theories. A higher-level and less
fundamental theory Tt reduces to a lower-level and more fundamental
theory Tb if and only if the laws of Tt can be deduced from the laws
of Tb with “bridge laws” relating the vocabulary of the two theories
and some auxiliary assumptions, if necessary. Most philosophers agree
that, in general, it is sufficient to derive an approximate version of
Tt in order to explain away its success. It is also worth noting that
the philosophers’ lexicon differs somewhat from that of the physicists:
philosophers say that Tt reduces to Tb if Tt can be shown to be a part
of Tb, while physicists often say that Tb reduces to Tt if Tb simplifies
to Tt in the relevant limit.
Back to EFTs, Cao and Schweber defend an anti-reductionist view.
They base their argument on the central claim that RG methods do not
by themselves determine the complexity and novelty of low-energy do-
mains without empirical inputs [11]. Cao and Schweber acknowledge
the existence of ‘causal’ connections between different domains: the
decoupling theorem and Wilsonian RG methods give a precise descrip-
tion of the effects of the high-energy physics on the dynamics of the
low-energy physics. However, they argue that these causal connections
are not sufficient to exhaust the theoretical content of the low-energy
effective theory. Here, again, they remain somewhat elusive. Their ar-
gument seems to follow from the claim that, typically, the appropriate
structure of the low-energy degrees of freedom, the form of their dy-
namics, and the value of the couplings cannot be simply derived from
the high-energy dynamics but are instead determined in large part by
appealing to low-energy empirical information.
Castellani [12] and Hartmann [27] give a more cautious assessment.
They note that, in many cases, distinct EFTs at different levels can
be explicitly related by means of deductive relations and bridge laws.
Here, the clearest example is provided by the Wilsonian derivation of
a low-energy theory from a high-energy one by integrating out heavy
degrees of freedom. And this suggests that, at least in principle, the
framework of EFTs does not exclude a full reconstruction of low-energy
EFTs from a more fundamental high-energy theory and therefore re-
mains neutral with respect to reductionism and antireductionism.
More recently, Bain made an attempt to extend further Cao and
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Schweber’s initial position by highlighting two crucial features of con-
crete cases of EFTs [2, 3]. Firstly, in most realistic cases, the low-energy
dynamical equations and degrees of freedom are formally distinct from
those of the high-energy theory. For instance, two successive theories
typically exhibit distinct structural properties (e.g., the symmetries
of their Lagrangian). And if the difference between the two theories
and their degrees of freedom is “substantial enough”, Bain claims, the
theories are not, strictly speaking, a “part” of one another and admit
distinct ontological interpretations [2]. We agree in principle: for in-
stance, the expression of the pion fields is substantially distinct and not
directly derivable from the expression of the quark and gluons fields.
However, taken by itself, Bain’s criterion of “substantial” formal dis-
tinctness does not pose a real threat to the existence of a successful
Nagelian reduction. For one thing, it does not prevent the possibility
of mapping the low-energy and high-energy degrees of freedom on one
another. For another, a successful Nagelian reduction only requires the
low-energy theory to be similar to, but not formally identical with, a
‘part’ of the high-energy theory.
Secondly, the relation between two EFTs involve approximations
and heuristic reasoning: e.g., performing a saddle point approximation
when integrating out heavy fields or taking the zero mass limit of some
light field. Bain claims that these features make the task of formulating
the relation between two theories in terms of a mathematical derivation
difficult, if not impossible. Here, again, successful Nagelian reductions
are relatively permissive to the use of intermediary approximations,
assumptions, and heuristic reasoning. The ultimate goal of a Nagel-
ian reduction is to explain away the success of the low-energy theory
by means of the high-energy theory, not to provide a strict derivation
relying only on the resources of the high-energy theory.
Butterfield offers a further response both to Cao and Schweber
and to Bain [9]. He centers his defense of Nagelian reduction between
successive EFTs around one central idea: RG methods specify families
of Nagelian reductions of low-energy (approximately) renormalizable
EFTs to high-energy non-renormalizable ones. Butterfield does not
say much about the potential complexity of the tower of EFTs but his
point is relatively straightforward to understand:
1. Nagelian reductions hold for low-energy EFTs obtained by inte-
grating out high-energy degrees of freedom;
2. Nagelian reductions hold when we run the RG flow towards low
energies and if we make an approximation, e.g., by eliminating
negligible non-renormalizable terms;
3. Nagelian reductions hold when we construct EFTs in the bottom-
up method and connect them to higher theories in the RG space
by means of matching conditions (the reduction demands in this
case a few more approximations).
Furthermore, Butterfield suggests a concept of emergence compatible
with successful Nagelian reductions [7, 8]. The behavior of an entity is
emergent when it displays novel and robust properties with respect to
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some appropriate comparison class, for instance, the class of its sub-
atomic components. ‘Novelty’ means that the low-energy description
of a theory displays distinctive features which are not present in the
high-energy description. ‘Robustness’ means that we can modify the
high-energy description of a theory and still observe invariant novel
features at low energies. RG methods provide tools to both exhibit
these features across scales and establish approximate deductive rela-
tions between low- and high-energy theories.
His optimism notwithstanding, Butterfield seems to be too confi-
dent about the ability of a high-energy theory to explain away the
phenomena described by a low-energy theory via RG methods, when
the two theories are not simply related in the Wilsonian sense. On
the one hand, chiral perturbation theory gives a good example of a
low-energy EFT which cannot be directly matched to its high-energy
theory by means of perturbative calculations. Lattice QFT methods
may provide some relief here, but it remains a remarkable fact that
there exists no energy regime enabling a direct comparison between
the perturbative quantities obtained from chiral perturbation theory
and the perturbatively renormalizable version of QCD. More generally,
the phenomenon of confinement in the low-energy regime of QCD sug-
gests that the law-like behavior of quarks and gluons cannot even in
principle be used to explain the law-like behavior of hadrons. On the
other hand, the success of Butterfield’s RG-based argument depends
on considerations of naturalness: the sensitivity of relevant operators
to high energies goes some way against the robustness of low-energy
phenomena [47].
5 Conclusion: Fundamentality and the ul-
timate aspirations of physics
Effective field theories are not fundamental by intent and by design.
Physicists may be embarrassed by this state of affairs but they are also
quick to recognize the importance of the EFT framework for computing
the values of physical observables in a situation when no such calcula-
tion is feasible in the high-energy theory. We discussed in the previous
section whether these kinds of concerns prevent a reductionist view on
the inter-theoretic relations between putatively fundamental theories
and EFTs, and between EFTs themselves. There exists, however, a
more general meaning of reduction which might be seen as making the
question of inter-theoretic reduction between successive theories some-
what less urgent. We conclude by discussing this meaning, for it also
relates to two distinctive visions of the future of physics.
In its most extreme form, the reductionist approach is based on the
claim that, ultimately, all non-fundamental theories in physics will be
reduced to a single unified, complete, and final theory. Cao and Schwe-
ber argue that the EFT framework goes some way towards undermin-
ing our confidence in the existence and relevance of such a theory.
Instead, this framework favors the scenario of a never-ending tower of
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EFTs with no ultimate or overarching theoretical account that would
unify them or provide a single, fundamental description of the world.
The elusive and highly speculative character of this argument has
made it an easy target in the literature [9, 12, 13, 27, 29, 39]. Overall,
the main response is that the framework of EFTs does not warrant the
scenario of a never-ending tower of EFTs as opposed to other possibil-
ities, for two principal reasons:
1. We may either find the final and complete theory or keep replac-
ing current EFTs by more comprehensive ones;
2. The fact that current realistic QFTs are best understood and
formulated as EFTs does not imply anything specific about the
existence or the form of a final theory.
As Butterfield summarizes it, “. . . in the present state of knowledge, we
have no compelling reason, even for energies for which we can be con-
fident of the QFT framework (and so: independently of considerations
of quantum gravity), to believe in what . . . I called the ‘vision’, namely
a tower of theories that are not each derivable from some single theory,
as an approximation describing physics within their own energy range”
[9].
These last remarks suggest a number of general lessons from the
debate on EFTs. Firstly, few philosophers and physicists take seriously
the scenario of a never-ending tower of EFTs, although it is an inter-
esting and conceptually challenging picture which finds some grounds
in low-energy physics. But it is overly speculative. Secondly, among
the rare advocates of this picture, ‘effective theory’ is taken to refer
to any kind of non-fundamental, approximate theory. The view is also
typically inferred from the repeated failure of our best putatively fun-
damental theories over time:
Unlike perhaps in decades and centuries gone by, no compe-
tent scientist should retain an unfailing commitment to any
theory. All theories are incomplete, even given that some
theories are better than others. . . . Finally, one of the most
profound shifts in our thinking over the decades is that it
is really no longer appropriate to speak of ‘the correct the-
ory.’ There is no correct theory. Our tasks are to improve
theories via the effective theory approach, to seek deeper
and simplifying assumptions that account for it, solidify
those into a new theory, and then treat that new theory as
an effective theory, and repeat. . . . Theories are never to
be trusted—they are always “wrong” in the end—and with
concerted effort we can even anticipate when and how they
will break down. [45]
One should be cautious about making the notion of effective theory
too open-ended and too inclusive when drawing these kinds of infer-
ences. The final theory, if any, might either emerge as the ultimate
completion of a long and lasting theoretical endeavor or as a singular
revolutionary theoretical event in sharp discontinuity with what had
been done previously. In this context, pessimistic conclusions from the
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past are neither the only nor necessarily the most successful way to
draw philosophically interesting lessons.
Finally, a more methodological point: for sure, aversion to epis-
temic risk warrants some sympathy towards the ‘tower of EFTs’ sce-
nario. Only those willing to take ontological bets will continue to
point in the direction of a complete and final theory. This situation
has not changed much since the 1990s, when the philosophical de-
bate on EFTs began following the work of Cao and Schweber [11].
Although their original arguments have been variously criticized, re-
futed, elaborated, or re-established by different authors, the conceptual
palette has remained similar overall. To be sure, there are some novel-
ties. For instance, the recent attempts to defend the interpretative and
epistemic virtues of EFTs by means of a careful examination of their
mathematical structure are well-received. Effective field theories hold
good prospects for asking ontologically perspicuous and sensible ques-
tions about currently accessible domains. Yet, we believe that, as of
today, they do not give good enough reasons to draw a definitive con-
clusion about more fundamental philosophical questions. Meanwhile,
the framework of EFTs still remains an indispensable instrument for
conducting fruitful scientific research.
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